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We have long been concerned with understanding human behavior. Specifically, 
there has been an increased interest in biological explanations of antisocial behavior. 
These preliminary explanations, which stem from associations found in neuroscience, 
brain imaging and genetics, raise important ethical questions about free will, moral 
responsibility and blame. 
It is difficult to say at this point if these explanations lead individuals to believe 
that antisocial behavior is determined (at least to some degree), and should mitigate 
attributions of responsibility and blame, or if they make claims about who the individual 
is and should aggravate attributions of responsibility and blame. 
There are several reasons to completely disregard biological explanations of 
antisocial behavior in judgments about responsibility and blame. These include 
methodological issues with the science, misinterpretation of the scientific results, issues 
of human rights, disability, stigmatization, and exacerbation of racial and ethnic 
inequalities.  
As science continues to improve, several of the reasons to disregard these 
explanations will become obsolete and bring this dilemma back to the forefront. Notably, 
individuals already form beliefs about free will and use them to ascribe moral 
responsibility and blame. Evidence suggests that these views are malleable, and may 
be influenced by the motivation to punish, to discourage violations of norms, beliefs 
about individual affect, political views, and the desire to avoid discomfort. Science 
provides a better foundation for claims of moral responsibility and blame, as good 




of racial and socioeconomic injustice that directly affect attributions of moral 
responsibility and blame.  
 Lastly, biological explanations of antisocial behavior may be crucial in creating a 
shift from punitive models of criminal justice to a focus on rehabilitation. 
Ultimately, biological explanations of antisocial behavior may be able to 
differentiate which behavior is a product of disease or dysfunction, and which is not. 
Such a distinction, in combination with relevant application of moral values and 
principles, can help make more appropriate claims about mitigating or aggravating 
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“Men are more moral than they think and far more immoral than they can imagine.” 
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We, as a species, have a long-standing interest in understanding human 
behavior. This interest has led to the rise of the field of psychology, which attempts to 
use the scientific method to study and potentially explain human behavior. One of the 
interests in psychology relates to understanding antisocial behavior, that is behavior that 
violates the basic rights of others (Calkins & Keane, 2009), with disregard for the well-
being of others. The behavior can be characterized as immoral and may or may not be 
criminal. With time, social sciences came to look at external explanatory factors for 
antisocial behavior. This has included early life experiences (Patterson et al., 1989) and 
socioeconomic deprivation (Duncan et al., 1994). Later, other scientific fields began to 
provide explanations for antisocial behavior stemming from correlational findings 
between the subject of their discipline and behavior.  
Recently, biological explanations for antisocial behavior have even made their 
way into criminal proceedings, which have included the introduction of neuroimaging, 
electroencephalography and neuropsychological assessment as evidence in relation to 
responsibility (de Kogel & Westgeest, 2015). However, none of these have provided 
sufficient explanations of antisocial behavior for a consensus or the development of 
guidelines or a standard protocol (de Kogel & Westgeest, 2015). 
 
Behavioral Genetics 
Recent advances in behavioral genetics have begun to identify significant 
associations between biology and antisocial behavior. A meta-analytic review found that 




explained by genetic influences (Ferguson, 2010). This suggests the importance of 
determining whether and how behavioral genetics should inform our views of moral 
responsibility.  
Recently, variations in serotonergic genes (e.g., serotonin transporter gene and 
monoamine oxidase-A gene) have been linked to anti-social behavior (Ficks & 
Waldman, 2014). A point mutation in the monoamine oxidase-A gene(MAOA) gene has 
been shown to lead to a complete deficiency of MAO enzymatic activity that has been 
named Brunner syndrome, which has behavioral manifestations that include aggression 
and impulsivity (e.g., arson, attempted rape and exhibitionism) (Brunner et al., 1993). A 
study of Finnish prisoners found that a low-activity genotype of monoamine oxidase A 
(MAOA) (as well as a CDH13 gene – which codes for a neuronal membrane adhesion 
protein) were associated with extremely violent behavior (i.e., 10 or more homicides, 
attempted homicides or batteries) (Tiihonen et al., 2015). Individuals who experienced 
maltreatment in childhood were found to be significantly more likely to engage in adult 
antisocial behaviors when they possessed a genotype associated with low MAOA 
activity (as opposed to high MAOA activity) (Caspi et al., 2002). Additionally, a meta-
analysis found that a low-activity (as compared to high-activity) MAOA genotype in 
males (but not females) who experienced early maltreatment predicted antisocial 
behavior (Byrd & Manuck, 2014). These studies are likely only the beginning, with a 
wave of more research to better explain and identify genetic associations between 






The “Double-Edged Sword” Effect 
The rise of this science has created a tension between viewing genetic links to 
behavior as mitigating or aggravating of moral responsibility, (i.e., are the actions 
determined by individual biology or do they stem from one’s identity) (Tabb et al., 2019). 
This tension reflects two perspectives of the role genetics plays. On the one hand, a 
deterministic interpretation of behavioral genetics suggests that the individual was 
determined to behave in such a manner, and therefore could not have done otherwise. 
As with other deterministic explanations of previous behavior, this view suggests that an 
individual ought not to be held morally responsible for their anti-social behavior, or at 
least, that their responsibility ought to be mitigated (Tabb et al., 2019). On the other 
hand, genetic determinism also makes a potential claim about who this individual is (i.e., 
someone that carries out anti-social behavior) (Tabb et al., 2019). Such claims about an 
individual can appear to describe one’s personality, as it may be linked to patterns of 
behavior (and maybe even thoughts and feelings) that stems from individual biological 
factors (The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology, 2009). In this, also lies a 
claim about future behavior – that this individual is going to continue to behave in an 
anti-social manner – a belief that aggravates attributions of individual moral 
responsibility for past anti-social behavior.  
In the criminal setting, where moral responsibility is considered, behavioral 
genetics has led to a “double-edged sword” effect wherein genetic causes have had 
either a mitigating or aggravating effect on sentencing (Aspinwall et al., 2012; Cheung & 




influence neurobiological genetic evidence may have on judgment of moral 
responsibility in criminal cases. 
 
Biological Explanations of Behavior and Responsibility 
In order to assess the impact of biological explanations of behavior on 
sentencing, one study presented a hypothetical case (based on Mobley v. The State) to 
181 U.S. state trial judges, where the convict was diagnosed with anti-social personality 
disorder (Aspinwall et al., 2012). The case described an individual convicted of 
aggravated battery, who hit a store manager with a gun while attempting a robbery and 
then went on to brag about it to other detainees. The judges received psychiatric 
testimony about the defendant’s psychopathy. For half of the judges this included a 
neurobiological explanation of psychopathy that cited evidence about the low-activity 
MAOA genotype and brain function (and included that the defendant was tested for this 
genotype). Although the majority of judges focused on aggravating factors (86.7%), 
inclusion of the neurobiological explanation increased the proportion of judges listing 
mitigating factors (from 29.7 to 47.8%) and significantly reduced sentencing (from 13.93 
years to 12.83 years) (Aspinwall et al., 2012). Notably, inclusion of the neurobiological 
explanation seemed to have no effect on attributions of legal responsibility, moral 
responsibility, or free will of the hypothetical defendant, which were all rated high 
(Aspinwall et al., 2012). This provides further evidence of the existence of the double-
edged sword theory of biological explanations of behavior, as the judges maintained 
strong views on legal responsibility, moral responsibility and free will (of the hypothetical 




sentencing and increased considerations of mitigating factors. It is difficult to reconcile 
the inconsistency between the endurance of the judge’s views and the change in 
adjudicative outcomes. 
To assess reproducibility and universality, an identical study was conducted in 
Germany (with 372 German judges) to a translation of the same vignette, but with 
strikingly different results (Fuss et al., 2015). Introduction of a neurobiological 
explanation (i.e., genetic) for the defendant’s behavior as evidence significantly reduced 
the judges' estimation of legal responsibility but did not significantly reduce the prison 
sentence. In fact, an increased percentage of judges (from 6% to 23%) would order 
involuntary commitment in a forensic psychiatric hospital (Fuss et al., 2015). It is 
important to note that, even though sentencing someone to a forensic hospital or prison 
isolates the individual and prevents him or her from doing more harm to the general 
public, involuntary commitment in a forensic psychiatric hospital (as opposed to a 
prison) suggests diminished responsibility.  The main reason to involuntarily commit 
someone is for the individual to receive psychiatric treatment, as opposed to 
punishment (which is an important attribute of prison sentencing). Sentencing to 
forensic psychiatric hospitals often involves finding someone not guilty by reason of 
insanity. A successful insanity defense means that the individual should not be held 
morally responsible or blameworthy for their actions (Bloechl et al., 2007). This further 
supports the double-edged sword theory, but in an inverse way to the Aspinwall et al., 
study of U.S. judges. The authors noted that involuntary commitment based on 
diminished or absent legal responsibility can often be for a longer period than a prison 




likely moral) responsibility without a consequent reduction in sentences reflects an 
inconsistency, as one would expect that a reduction in attribution of responsibility would 
be associated with reduced negative consequences.   A potential explanation for this 
dissonance may be because consequentialist reasoning would call for protecting the 
public from the individual while attempting to treat them (especially because biological 
explanations of behavior suggest there is causal some pathway that can be altered) 
despite diminished responsibility and blameworthiness. 
Another study in Germany looked at the impact of biological explanations of 
antisocial behavior, but this time, in 317 law students. The researchers found similar 
results to the study with German judges in regards to attributions of legal and moral 
responsibility, as well as sentencing, of a defendant in a case of manslaughter (Guillen 
Gonzalez et al., 2019). Participants were presented with either no biological explanation 
of “psychopathy,” a neurological explanation (i.e., traumatic brain injury) or a genetic 
explanation (i.e., MAOA gene variant). The absence of a biological explanation was 
significantly associated with higher ratings of legal responsibility, however, there was no 
significant difference in prison sentencing, type of custody assigned, moral responsibility 
or free will (Guillen Gonzalez et al., 2019). A pairwise comparison of the student groups 
revealed that those who received a description containing an account of brain injury 
rated legal responsibility significantly lower than the students who did not receive any 
biological explanation (Guillen Gonzalez et al., 2019). No significant differences were 
observed between the group provided an account describing a MAOA gene 
susceptibility for psychopathy and the brain injury or no biological explanation groups 




explanations of antisocial behavior may have distinct impacts on views of responsibility 
and blame. Furthermore, there was no difference in the self-reported impact of the 
explanation of psychopathy on the participants’ decision-making (Guillen Gonzalez et 
al., 2019). It is difficult to make sense of why legal responsibility would be rated lower, 
without a change in views on moral responsibility or free will, nor result in the change of 
consequences (i.e., duration of sentencing or type of custody). Perhaps the biological 
explanations for behavior identified factors that are thought to be out of the hypothetical 
defendant’s control, which led to views of diminished legal responsibility, while the 
defendant’s actions were morally evaluated based on factors other than whether he had 
control over his behavior, and thus, he was still held morally responsible and deserving 
of punishment. However, such an explanation is unlikely to resolve the logical 
inconsistency of the outcomes in this study. Diminished legal responsibility in this case 
suggests that the defendant’s ability to control his behavior was diminished. Conversely, 
holding the defendant both morally responsible and deserving on punishment implies 
that he was free and in control during the wrongful act. Additionally, other than the 
biological explanations of behavior, there is nothing else to point to that would impact 
the decision-making process and result in different attributions of legal responsibility 
between the groups. The logical inconsistency lies in the contradiction between claims 
of legal and moral responsibility, which suggest that the defendant was both not and in 
control of his behavior.   
One study found that introduction of either neuroimaging (showing brain damage) 
or neurological testimony (stating that the defendant’s disorder began after a traumatic 




insanity (NGRI)” verdict by participants (Gurley & Marcus, 2008). Notably, participants 
who reported being influenced by psychological and neurological testimony were 
significantly more likely to give a NGRI verdict than those who reported that this 
evidence did not influence their decision about the verdict (Gurley & Marcus, 2008). 
Therefore, individuals’ beliefs about the explanatory role of biological mechanisms in 
human behavior seem to affect their views about moral responsibility.  
To expand the understanding of the public’s beliefs, a study of mock jurors 
looked at sentencing recommendations and impressions in a capital case (where the 
defendant is facing a potential death penalty)  (Greene & Cahill, 2012). The study found 
that defendants who were deemed likely to be dangerous in the future were less likely 
to be sentenced to death when mock jurors were exposed to neuropsychological and 
neuroimaging evidence (Greene & Cahill, 2012). Additionally, neuropsychological and 
neuroimaging evidence was reported to have a mitigating effect on mock jurors’ 
negative impressions of the defendant (Greene & Cahill, 2012). In this study, it appears 
that participants wanted the defendant at least locked away. The reported mitigating 
effects suggest that the mock jurors may have viewed neurobiological explanations of 
behavior in a more deterministic light, which reduced the degree to which they held the 
defendant morally responsible or deserving of death. Locking someone away can have 
punitive motivations, but also may acknowledge that society ought to be protected from 
a dangerous individual (even if they are not held responsible), while the death penalty is 
solely motivated by punitive desert. 
In a study of a representative sample of the U.S. population, introduction of 




conviction (first- or second-degree manslaughter or murder), or the sentence, and 
participants who received evidence of childhood abuse alone or evidence of childhood 
abuse and of genetic predisposition imposed longer sentences (Appelbaum & Scurich, 
2014). In addition, introduction of genetic and childhood abuse evidence produced the 
greatest fear of the defendant among study participants (Appelbaum & Scurich, 2014). 
The fear may stem from perceptions of the defendant as an individual who regularly 
engages in antisocial behavior and concern for future recurrence. In this sample, it is 
possible that views of future dangerousness motivated longer sentencing (in order to 
product the public), regardless of considerations about moral responsibility and 
blameworthiness. Alternatively, longer sentencing may be a function of greater 
attributions of morally responsibility and blameworthiness.  
  Another study attempted to identify motivations for punishment in the context of 
biological explanations of antisocial behavior. The study showed that neurobiological 
evidence led to shorter prison sentences (i.e., mitigating) and longer terms of 
involuntary hospitalization (i.e., aggravating) than psychological evidence (Allen et al., 
2019). This evidence supports the existence of the double-edged sword theory – 
contradictory views on responsibility, blame and what the offending individual deserves. 
The authors note that the motivation for these decisions were not well explained by 
motivations to treat defendants or to protect society from dangerous persons, but by 
“deontological motivations” related to what the defendant deserved and the duty to 
provide healthcare services (Allen et al., 2019). This suggests that views on moral 
responsibility and blameworthiness may have played a role in the sentencing, as the 




more compassionate to want individuals to receive treatment rather than punishment for 
antisocial behavior, and these results hint that biological explanations of behavior may 
lead to motivational changes in justice (especially in criminal cases) from punitive 
retribution to rehabilitation. 
One important critique of the existence of the double-edged sword theory has 
come from an analysis of real criminal cases. A study of 800 criminal cases from 1992 
to 2012 that included neuroscience found that neuroscience evidence is more often 
introduced to mitigate punishments (i.e., sentencing), especially in cases where 
defendants face the possibility of the death penalty, a life sentence or a significantly 
long prison sentence (Denno, 2015). The current real-life implications suggest that it is 
important to determine how biological information ought to be used in the context of 
moral responsibility. It is noteworthy that the expectation for neuroscientific evidence is 
so strong in such criminal proceedings, that failure of defense attorneys to introduce it 
as mitigating evidence can be grounds for granting defendants’ “ineffective assistance 
of counsel” claims by courts (Denno, 2015). The increase in the demand for introducing 
neuroscience in criminal proceedings, to better inform responsibility, conveys the 
urgency of determining how biological explanations of behavior ought to inform our 
views of moral responsibility. 
A different analysis of existing cases critiqued the claim that neurobiological 
evidence is primarily introduced in the most serious (i.e., capital) cases. In a study of 
1585 cases and 1800 judicial opinions that looked at the use of neuroscience in legal 
proceedings, results indicated that only about 40% of the cases were capital (where the 




other serious felony cases (e.g., drug possession, drug trafficking, violent assaults, 
robbery, fraud) (Farahany, 2016). This suggests that neuroscience is being introduced 
in cases where a variety (and different degrees) of criminal (and antisocial) behavior are 
being considered, further increasing the importance of determining how this information 
ought to inform our distinctions of responsibility and blame for antisocial behavior. This 
same study also found that, in criminal cases (capital and non-capital), the reversal rate 
was higher in cases where neurobiological evidence was introduced on appeal than the 
rate for all criminal appellate cases (Farahany, 2016). This suggests that there is some 
variation in the degree to which biological explanations of behavior may play a role in 
ascription of guilt, and concurrently moral responsibility. 
Without consensus in studies of hypothetical cases, or in studies that looked at 
real criminal proceedings, it appears that the double-edged sword effect exists, and its 
associated dilemma of how we ought to utilize biological explanations of antisocial 
behavior to understand moral (and criminal) responsibility and blame needs to be 
addressed. 
 
Escaping the Dilemma 
It is important to note that the answer to the dilemma is not a question of 
scientific understanding, but of ethical foresight. Inevitably, science will be able to tell us 
more and more about mechanisms, genes, and biological markers that are implicated or 
correlate with specific behavior. However, even though our understanding of the 
mechanistic processes involved in behavior is likely to improve, none of these 




judgments about responsibility and blame. This is an extension of David Hume’s is-
ought gap, which states that we cannot derive normative statements (i.e., moral claims) 
from only descriptive statements (i.e., facts about the world) (Hume, 2007). Scientific 
explanations can be utilized, but the introduction of a moral claim, principle or value is 
necessary to draw a moral conclusion. 
The simplest option to escape the double-edged sword dilemma is to simply 
ignore biological explanations of antisocial behavior when we make moral value 
judgments.  Some believe that science cannot provide answers to difficult moral 
questions (Eastman & Campbell, 2006). However, science is not entirely morally 
neutral, since what we chose to study or fund is reflective of individual and societal 
values. Additionally, even though biological explanations may not tell us exactly how we 
ought to relate to details about the way the natural world works, science does not have 
to provide the entire answer to a difficult moral question to be useful for moral inquiries. 
Although science itself may not tell us how to make a specific moral judgment, it can 
provide extremely relevant information for moral decision making. To ignore such 
relevant information may doom moral decision making to be based on less desirable 
information (e.g., prejudice) or less justifiable reasoning (e.g., the status quo bias). The 
decision to use biological explanations of antisocial behavior to inform questions about 
moral responsibility is really an ethical concern (i.e., what is the right thing to do). 
Ultimately, we must choose what we should use to ground or support decisions of moral 





There is a major flaw with current biological explanations of antisocial behavior. 
The science they are grounded in (including genetics) does not tell us much about 
causality of behavior in general, let alone a specific action (Tatarelli et al., 2014). The 
neuroscience or genetics that attempts to address behavior is often a population-level 
science (i.e., correlation between neurological or genetic variations and behavioral 
variations in a population), and therefore do not meaningfully explain why a specific 
individual behaved in a specific way. It is difficult to mitigate responsibility without 
illustrating how a biological factor directly affected a specific behavior. However, 
sentencing may be influenced by public concerns (e.g., public safety, societal views on 
rehabilitation versus retribution), in addition to individual blameworthiness, and therefore 
may be more influenced by population-level science. This is likely why neurobiological 
or genetic evidence has had little effect on determination of guilt or innocence, and 
more of an impact on sentencing (Farahany, 2016). Furthermore, there is no currently 
established causal link between specific biological correlates and specific criminal (or 
antisocial) behavior, and future research aimed at establishing these correlates is 
methodologically limited (Urbaniok et al., 2012). For example, comparing individual 
cases or highly selective samples against voluntary controls does not provide enough 
evidence of causality or its direction (i.e., did the antisocial behavior lead to the 
presence of the biological correlate), nor are there ways to account for confounding 
variables (Eastman & Campbell, 2006; Urbaniok et al., 2012). In addition, biological 
correlates have not been able to show any predictive validity (Eastman & Campbell, 
2006). This is particularly troubling because, at least in some of the studies and real-




and has aggravated sentencing (which may be motivated by desires to protect the 
public, irrespective of beliefs about free will, responsibility, blame or desert). The 
difficulty for biology to explain why a specific act occurred or its misinterpretation in 
predicting future behavior is worrisome, as moral decisions may be swayed by false 
ideas about reality. 
Another important reason to steer away from biological explanations of antisocial 
behavior is that the science, and its implications for behavior, can easily be 
misrepresented and posited to have more validity than is true (Eastman & Campbell, 
2006).. Misinterpretations of scientific findings, especially ones that overly presume the 
existence of a relationship where there is not one, are not uncommon. In fact, news 
articles written about scientific literature often run the risk of misrepresenting study 
results, and sometimes do so with catchy titles, in order to lure readers (Moore, 2006). 
There are also scientists who overemphasize the implications of their findings 
(intentionally or not) to help justify the importance of their work. Such 
misrepresentations exacerbate ethical concerns about basing moral decisions on faulty 
information. 
The use of biological explanations in the evaluation of moral responsibility, 
especially in the case of antisocial behavior, raises important human rights and disability 
concerns. Genetic predisposition to antisocial behavior could come to be viewed as a 
“mental impairment” (Forzano et al., 2010). This may subsequently lead to individuals 
with identifiable predispositions to be seen as having a mental illness and a disability, 
which could lead to social stigma and maltreatment. At this point such labeling would be 




labeling would be particularly problematic if antisocial behavior does not become 
manifest, for example if certain factors protect against phenotypic manifestation of the 
genetic predisposition. Additionally, although privacy issues (in this case, of personal 
health information) can often be addressed by policy and regulation, ensuing 
stigmatization is often much more difficult to combat (Wilson, 2015).  
Biological explanations of behavior also may exacerbate racial and ethnic 
inequities and related stigma, especially in the US, where racial tensions are high, and 
raise additional human rights concerns (Berryessa et al., 2013; Wilson, 2015). For 
example, the presence and expression of genes can vary between different ethnic and 
racial groups, as has been seen with the MAOA gene (Caspi et al., 2002). An 
exacerbation of ethnic stigmatization has already been seen after a study involving the 
Māori population and the MAOA-L gene (Berryessa et al., 2013). This indigenous 
Polynesian ethnic group in New Zealand ties its history to a warrior culture, similar to 
other Polynesian groups, which the study utilized for stereotyping the group in relation 
to the “warrior gene” (Berryessa et al., 2013). Interest in biological explanations of 
undesirable (e.g., antisocial) behavior also creates opportunities to identify and control 
certain attributes of individuals, which is reminiscent of eugenics movements (De Paor 
& Blanck, 2016). Eugenics movements typically targeted individuals who were 








Answers to the Dilemma 
Despite reasons to avoid using science to inform our moral judgments of 
responsibility and blame regarding antisocial behavior, the dilemma about the 
appropriate use of science persists. It is important to acknowledge that over time 
science may improve to the point where it is authentically able to adequately predict 
and/or explain antisocial behavior. With some of the methodological issues resolved, 
the questions raised by this dilemma would once again come to the forefront. If this 
occurs, individuals may be more likely to be judged as morally responsible for their 
antisocial behavior, especially if they fail to obtain proper testing for relevant 
biomarkers, and preventative or remedial interventions (Eastman & Campbell, 2006). 
Justice issues associated with equal access to such testing and interventions would 
arise, as those with the means to access such testing or interventions could escape 
negative consequences, while those without access would not. Identification and 
stigmatization of individuals who are predicted to engage in antisocial behavior may 
also lead to preventive detention, especially for those without access to interventions 
(Eastman & Campbell, 2006). Preventive detention would be particularly worrisome, as 
it would treat individuals as morally responsible and worthy of punishment without any 
action having occurred (even if is done under the guise of protecting the public). It is 
incumbent upon us to decide now how to ethically use biological explanations of 
antisocial behavior in evaluations of moral responsibility so that severe negative 
repercussions are avoided when some of the obstacles to the use of biological 
explanations are overcome. Otherwise, while a consensus on ethical use is being 




Additionally, without further elaborating the criteria by which scientific explanations for 
antisocial behavior should or should not influence determinations of blameworthiness, 
individuals who ought not to be held responsible (and punished) will continue to be so, 
improperly. 
Ensuring the science is utilized ethically now can also preempt many of the 
arguments against utilizing it in the first place. First and foremost, ethical use would 
demand that the science be translated appropriately and clearly, that confidentiality is 
maintained, that it does not infringe on human rights, that stigma is prevented, and that 
it is not utilized for malicious purposes (e.g., eugenics).  
There are also unique reasons for using biological information to inform our 
moral value judgements. Biological information is consistent and reproducible. This has 
important justice implications, as it allows less room for bias and subjectivity stemming 
from cultural, religious or political views. The use of DNA testing in criminal proceedings 
can tell if a suspect’s sample matches the DNA found at a crime scene. No matter how 
strongly cultural, religious or political opinion may want a particular suspect to be the 
responsible party, this cannot change the results of the DNA test. This kind of 
consistency can be important to making sure that antisocial behavior is judged morally 
consistently, and that social injustice does not continue to propagate our views of 
responsibility and blame. In the same spirit, improvement in biological explanations of 
antisocial behavior can lead to identifiable markers that can be used to distinguish 
individuals who ought not be held morally responsible. This is ultimately dependent on 
what we deem as mitigating explanations of antisocial behavior. The determination will 




provided by science. In order to overcome the current pitfalls arising from bias and 
subjectivity associated with cultural, religious or political views, the criteria for the 
normative distinction between mitigating and aggravating explanations of antisocial 
behavior must stem from ethical and just values and principles. 
Biological explanations of antisocial behavior, especially with an emphasis on 
psychopathology, may justify a shift from punitive models of criminal justice to a focus 
on rehabilitation (Sabatello & Appelbaum, 2017). This shift would be consistent with 
some of the results from the studies of judges, law students and the lay public, as well 
as real world cases, in which consideration of behavioral genetic evidence mitigated 
responsibility, blame or punishment. This shift would likely come about from a more 
medicalized view of individuals who engage in antisocial behavior (e.g. criminal 
defendants) (Sabatello & Appelbaum, 2017). Medicalization of antisocial behavior could 
also be critical in changing opinions that favor rehabilitation (over punishment) as, 
hopefully, scientific discoveries lead to novel therapeutic targets and ethical ways of 
rehabilitating individuals who engage in antisocial behavior. This would be optimal from 
a consequentialist viewpoint, as punitive criminal justice is a large cost to individuals 
and the public, with few benefits. This would also be viewed favorably from a social 
justice lens, as marginalized and vulnerable groups disproportionally face the 
consequences of the current punitive model of criminal justice. However, there is 
concern that biological explanations of antisocial behavior would push us further into a 
punitive model of criminal justice (and further propagate social injustice), as some of the 
studies and cases involving behavioral genetic evidence led to greater perceptions of 




from increased perceptions of dangerousness). Biological explanation of antisocial 
behavior may also propagate stigma, discrimination and injustice by enabling easier 
identification of individuals with relevant psychopathology. The disconcerting distinction 
between a future that focuses on rehabilitation and treatment versus stigma, 
punishment and injustice further intensifies the need to determine and propel ethical 
and just use of science in this context. 
 
Beliefs About Free Will and Responsibility 
Another reason to incorporate biological explanations of behavior is that people 
already make presumptions about whether individuals behave freely or not, which are 
not grounded in ethical or just moral principles and values. In fact, Clark et. al., found 
that individuals are more likely to report a belief in free will when considering an immoral 
action than a morally neutral one (Clark et al., 2014). The two immoral actions 
described include a corrupt judge who was caught for kickbacks (i.e., receiving money 
in exchange) from private juvenile detention centers for sentencing children to jail, and a 
robber who steals all of the valuables of a special education teacher (Clark et al., 2014). 
The authors strengthened their claim by showing that reading about immoral behaviors 
in the robbery case reduced individual perceptions of the benefits of anti-free-will 
psychological research (Clark et al., 2014). The investigators further strengthened their 
claim by showing that the real-world prevalence of immoral behavior (i.e., rates of 
national homicides and other crimes) predicted free will belief on a national level (Clark 
et al., 2014). The group also found evidence that the higher likelihood of believing in 




the offending individual (Clark et al., 2014). The investigators were able to demonstrate 
this relationship when comparing the scenario of the robbery with a morally neutral 
action, and a staged cheating situation amongst students (Clark et al., 2014). The 
findings of these studies have been confirmed by additional studies and metanalyses 
(Clark et al., 2019). 
These findings suggest that a belief in free will functions to hold people morally 
responsible for immoral acts and helps justify punishing these individuals. The immoral 
actions described above can be considered a form of antisocial behavior, as the judge 
does not appear to consider the well-being of the children he is sentencing to jail in 
exchange for money, nor is the robber considering the well-being of the teacher. An 
innate drive to punish may lead us to believe that one acted freely, and thus deserves a 
full ascription of moral responsibility and punishment for their behavior. If there is a drive 
to punish antisocial behavior, and that drive is what leads to link free will with moral 
responsibility in a given situation, there is no reason to think that these beliefs 
approximate the truth about how freely an individual behaved nor that this is the morally 
correct view to have. Most importantly, the findings that punitive motivations lead to a 
higher likelihood of believing in free will when considering an immoral action suggest 
that the causal chain of judgments about free will, moral responsibility and punishment 
may not be in the direction that we presumed. One would expect that a belief in free will 
would lead to holding someone morally responsible for their antisocial behavior and 
motivate punishment. The results of these studies suggest that the desire to punish 
antisocial (i.e., immoral) acts and to hold people morally responsible for them motivates 




Clark et. al. proposed that belief in free will may help individuals justify punitive 
retaliation for immoral (or antisocial) behavior, and therefore alleviate the distress one 
might experience from deeming someone worthy of punishment (Clark et al., 2017). The 
authors found that the tendency to be motivated by punitiveness predicted increased 
levels of anxiety only for those individuals who were skeptical of free will (Clark et al., 
2017). This suggests that some individuals may be able to alleviate some of their 
anxiety around evaluating immoral behavior by forming concrete beliefs about free will. 
The investigators also found that higher incarceration rates (i.e., real world 
punitiveness) were predictive of higher rates of mental health issues at a state level 
(Clark et al., 2017). Highly punitive treatment of immoral behavior may have a reciprocal 
effect on society’s mental health. In an economic game, study participants who 
punished a partner who acted unfairly reported more distress than those who did not, 
but only when their partner did not have a choice but to act unfairly (Clark et al., 2017). 
These findings may be indicative of how individual uncertainty about free will and a 
moral agent’s ability to do otherwise may evoke negative emotions in the punisher. 
Lastly, the authors found that punitive desires for wrong behavior led to reports of higher 
levels of distress only for those individuals who had their beliefs about free will 
undermined by inclusion of an argument against free will (Clark et al., 2017). This 
further suggests that affirming a more concrete belief about free will may alleviate the 
negative emotions one experiences when judging someone to be blameworthy and 
deserving of punishment. Of course, these findings do not provide a definitive 
explanation of beliefs about free will and its implications. However, if these findings do 




behavior (based on beliefs about free will), blameworthy and deserving of punishment 
because it is distressful for us to do otherwise. 
In an attempt to better understand the relationship between motivations for moral 
judgments and a belief in free will, a different group carried out a series of experiments. 
They corroborated Clark et al’s findings that people tend to attribute more free will to 
those individuals who engaged in immoral behavior as opposed to morally neutral acts 
(Monroe & Ysidron, 2021). Through another experiment they found that attributions of 
free will can be changed (Monroe & Ysidron, 2021). Specifically, they found that when 
someone engages in behavior that deviates from expected norms, it is presumed that 
this deviation occurred as an expression of the individual’s free will (Monroe & Ysidron, 
2021). This is concerning, as changing beliefs about free will, moral responsibility and 
blame allow room for bias to influence how we view antisocial behavior. The worry is 
that factors which often characterize vulnerable and marginalized groups (e.g., race or 
socioeconomic status) will dominate these viewpoints and continue to propagate social 
injustices. It is also concerning if deviations from norms are what lead to a higher 
likelihood of attribution of free will, moral responsibility and blame as it is an assault on 
individuality and choice – the cornerstones of freedom. If people experience negative 
consequences (e.g., are held more responsible for an act and deserving of punishment) 
simply for behaving differently than they were expected to (i.e., according to norms) 
then the metaphysical existence (or absence) of free will is functionally irrelevant. 
Society will treat these individuals as if they acted freely and are morally responsible 





Notably, political conservatives seem to have stronger belief in free will. To help 
better understand this, a series of experiments assessed whether stronger beliefs in 
free will among political conservatives were linked to a greater tendency to moralize, 
which would then lead to an increased motivation to assign blame (Everett et al., 2021). 
In a meta-analysis, conservatives were found to have a higher likelihood to moralize 
than liberals, even for moralization measures without political content (Everett et al., 
2021). Also, conservative ideology was found to have a positive correlation with free will 
belief, and this relationship was significantly mediated by findings of blameworthiness 
(i.e., tendency to blame) (Everett et al., 2021). In addition, political conservatism was 
associated with higher attributions of free will for specific events, even though all of the 
events in the study were determined to be equally immoral for both liberals and 
conservatives (Everett et al., 2021). Although there was no difference in attribution of 
free will between conservatives and liberals when both groups saw an action as equally 
wrong, conservatives attributed less free will to an agent when they saw an action as 
less wrong than liberals (Everett et al., 2021). These results suggest that conservatives 
endorsed stronger beliefs in free will because of a motivation to blame, instead of it 
being a fixed belief. Furthermore, specific perceptions of wrongness were found to 
mediate the relationship between political ideology and free will attributions (Everett et 
al., 2021). Finally, both political conservatives and liberals were found to differentially 
attribute free will to identical actions (involving a potential moral violation) depending 
on who performed it (Everett et al., 2021). Specifically, study participants reported 
greater attributions of free will if the agent held the opposite political beliefs than them 




political differences (i.e., conservative versus liberal) in beliefs about free will can at 
least partially be explained by a greater tendency among conservatives to moralize 
behavior, which can then increase the motivation to blame individuals for their behavior. 
If this is indeed the case, then, for at least some individuals, finding others morally 
responsible and blameworthy may stem from a desire to demean them. This would be 
counterproductive to ethically and justly distinguishing those worthy of being held moral 
responsibility and blame.  
Beliefs in free will and moral responsibility also are influenced by affect, as 
shown in a meta-analysis (Feltz & Cova, 2014). The role of affect is concerning, as 
there is no consistency in affect across people that provides an objective foundation for 
these beliefs and their implications. On the contrary, it hints at capriciousness and 
creates more room for injustice. 
Although none of these associations certainly or entirely explain differences in 
attributions of free will, blame and responsibility, they do continue to raise concerns 
about the malleable nature of these beliefs. If individuals will change their ascriptions of 
responsibility based on their affect or their own propensity to moralize and blame, 
because an agent holds contrasting political views to theirs, because they deviated from 
expected norms, or because of the distress they experience otherwise, it would be 
difficult to say that the resulting judgements are fair, let alone objective.  
Ultimately, ethical inquiry needs to provide guidance about how biological 
explanations of antisocial behavior ought to be used in evaluations of moral 
responsibility and blame. Individuals already form beliefs about whether or not others 




malleable nature of these beliefs and the motivations to punish or alleviate one’s own 
anxiety after punishing others are inappropriate for an ethical interpretation of behavior. 
It seems far more ethical to allow something more objective, such as science, to 
influence and inform our moral value judgements. 
 
Disease, Dysfunction and Responsibility 
By better understanding the biological mechanisms involved in antisocial 
behavior, we may come to make appropriate distinctions about which behavior 
deserves a reduction in blame and responsibility, and which does not. Of course, moral 
claims, values or principles will still need to be utilized (to overcome the is-ought gap) in 
order to make normative judgements about responsibility and blame. Also, it is 
important to note that we do not need biological explanations of antisocial behavior to 
establish true causality for a specific event. What would be relevant is an explanation 
that, in combination with relevant moral principles or values, suggests that an 
individual’s biology contributed to their behavior in a meaningful way that would mitigate 
their responsibility. 
One potential way this may be actualized is to better distinguish which antisocial 
behavior is associated with disease or dysfunction (i.e, psychopathology) and which is 
not. Although this distinction already seems to exist for antisocial personality disorder 
(i.e., psychopathy) – which is categorized as a disease – there is still debate about 
whether it is appropriately defined as a psychiatric disorder, and if its presence should 
absolve or reduce individual moral responsibility for antisocial behavior (Malatesti & 




biological mechanisms involved in or that lead to the development of antisocial 
personality disorder, and the criticism that the criteria for the disorder are heavily 
influenced by values (Malatesti & McMillan, 2014). Advances in the biological 
understanding of antisocial behavior may help address the first criticism. The second 
criticism is not unique to antisocial personality disorder, in fact all classifications of 
disease incorporate values, which is not necessarily bad or likely to change (Sisti et al., 
2013). 
 An example of an attempt at such a distinction is the neuromoral theory of 
antisocial, violent, and psychopathic behavior, which attempts to distinguish between 
different expressions of antisocial behavior, as characterized by differing degrees of 
neuromoral dysfunction (Raine, 2019). This model suggests that primary psychopathy 
(i.e., antisocial personality disorder), proactive aggression and continuous antisocial 
behavior over one’s life are severely and significantly affected by neuromoral 
dysfunction, while secondary psychopathy, reactive aggression, and crimes involving 
drugs are relatively less affected (Raine, 2019). Individuals with primary psychopathy, 
proactive aggression and continuous antisocial behavior cognitively understand what 
immoral, and cognitive capacity is fundamental to views of responsibility. However, the 
dysfunction in their emotional moral capacity, which is important for decision-making, 
provides reasons for mitigating their responsibility and blameworthiness (Raine, 2019). 
The usefulness of this theory in evaluations of moral responsibility does not stand solely 
on whether the science it utilizes makes true claims about human behavior, but also on 
whether emotional moral capacity (and whether it is impaired) is fundamental to who we 




The distinction in moral responsibility judgments based on psychopathology is 
not novel. This is part of the current criteria for an insanity defense, as individuals 
acquitted on the basis of an NGRI are not held morally responsible or blameworthy 
(Bloechl et al., 2007). The lack of an identifiable or demonstrable disease or dysfunction 
currently defaults to holding one responsible. 
As the understanding of biological mechanisms of antisocial behavior improves, it 
will be up to ethical theory to appropriately define what dysfunction is (e.g., deviation 
from a norm or evolutionarily selected function, or harmfulness to self), as well as which 




Science may well come to explain how and why antisocial behavior occurs. This 
will create room for a more objective understanding of how we ought to view such 
behavior. The reservations that exist about using biological explanations of antisocial 
behavior in attributions of moral responsibility can be addressed through proper 
utilization of science, ethical policy, and adequate protection of individual health 
information. 
Judgments about free will, responsibility and blame are commonplace. There is 
evidence that suggests that these views are malleable, and may be influenced by the 
motivation to punish, to discourage violations of norms, individual affect, and political 
views. In light of these influences, the question of whether or not (and how) we should 




responsibility and blame is one for ethics. We must decide what ought to be at the 
foundation of our moral beliefs. I argue that science ought to be this foundation.  
Without reliance on science, there is greater opportunity for undesirable drivers, as well 
as prejudice and bias, to dictate our morality. The implications of this are unimaginable, 
as our moral views play a role in everything from our individual interpersonal 
interactions to how large groups of people (e.g., nations) treat each other.  
Science will facilitate more objective judgements rather than judgments that are 
dictated by people’s preconceived opinions. Therefore, biological explanations of 
antisocial behavior should be incorporated into the discussion of moral responsibility, 
especially if we want the conversation to be driven by objective claims and morality, 
instead of bias. 
One way to accomplish an ethical incorporation of science into judgements about 
moral responsibility is to first specify which biological explanations of antisocial behavior 
point to psychopathology. Then, relevant moral values or principles will need to be 
utilized to determine which biological explanations are worthy of mitigating or 
aggravating moral responsibility and blame. The challenge for ethics is to better define 
what is mitigating (or aggravating) about particular types of psychopathology. Currently, 
this definition is based on the cognitive capacity to distinguish right and wrong. There is 
reason to believe that biological explanations of antisocial behavior will bring to light 
other important features that will help better identify when moral responsibility and 
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